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Torts-PARENTS IN WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTION ARE ENTITLED TO
RECOVER THE EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES OF RAISING A DEFECTIVE
CHILD TO AGE OF MAJORITY BUT ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER
ORDINARY EXPENSES OF REARING A NORMAL OR DEFECTIVE
CHILD-Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
Plaintiffs, John and Edith Fassoulas, were the parents of two
children, both of whom were born with congenital defects.' Be-
cause their children's defects were genetically transmitted, the
Fassoulases decided not to have any more children. John Fassoulas
sought the services of defendant, Dr. John R. Ramey, for a vasec-
tomy in order that Mrs. Fassoulas could avoid future pregnancies.'
In November 1974, approximately ten months after Dr. Ramey
negligently performed an ineffective vasectomy on John Fassoulas,
Edith became pregnant and subsequently gave birth to a daughter,
Maria.' Maria suffered from a number of congenital deformities
such as abnormal shaping of the skull, a short neck, redundant
skin, and malformations of the hands with several digits missing
from the right hand. Additionally, Maria was mentally retarded
and suffered from heart problems and hypertension.4 Edith Fas-
soulas became pregnant again in September 1976, and gave birth
to a son, Roussi, born with a slight physical deformity which was
later corrected.5 Plaintiffs brought suit in the Circuit Court for
Dade County against Dr. Ramey and the members of his profes-
sional association alleging medical malpractice and claiming vari-
ous consequential damages including past and future expenses for
the care and upbringing of Maria and Roussi.a
The defendants were granted a pretrial motion to strike the
claim for rearing expenses but later the court reversed itself and
reinstated the claim. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs and assessed damages at $250,000 for the birth of
Maria and $100,000 for the birth of Roussi. Since the jury found
defendants fifty percent negligent in the birth of Roussi, plaintiffs'
award for his wrongful birth was reduced to $50,000.7
On appeal there was no dispute as to defendant's negligent per-
formance of John Fassoulas' vasectomy. The only issue was the
1. Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
2. Id. at 199.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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trial court's inclusion of past and future rearing expenses as part of
the consequential damages suffered by plaintiffs.
I. THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
The Third District Court of Appeal acknowledged that a cause
of action does exist in Florida for the wrongful birth of a child as a
result of a physician negligently performing a sterilization or abor-
tion.8 However, the court determined that consequential damages
of a physician's negligence could not include the normal expenses
of raising a child to majority because the legal obligation of sup-
port is solely the duty of the parents.9 An exception to this was
noted where the child is born with substantial mental or physical
defects for which defendant physician was liable for special
damages.10
Florida case law on the issue of wrongful birth is not only sparse
but unsettled. The Florida Supreme Court has yet to hear a wrong-
ful birth or wrongful life case. The district courts which have
handed down decisions are not in accord as to what damages may
be recoverable in wrongful birth actions. The purpose of this note
is to examine the treatment of wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims, both nationally and in Florida. Special attention will be
given to the problem of damage calculation in these actions.
II. FLORIDA'S TREATMENT OF WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIMS
The earliest Florida case to deal with a wrongful birth action was
Jackson v. Anderson in 1970.11 There the Second District held
that in a suit for malpractice, the jury could assess whatever dam-
ages a plaintiff could prove resulted from the defendant physi-
cian's negligent performance of a tubal ligation and the ensuing
birth of a healthy child.
In 1974, the same court rejected a complaint by the three minor
children of the victim of yet another failed sterilization. The court
refused recovery for the minors' share of parental love and affec-
tion and share of worldly wealth being reduced from one-third to
one-fourth shares, viewing the action as one "without foundation
in law or logic. 1 2 Although actions for diminished parental capac-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 489.
10. Id.
11. 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
12. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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ity have been asserted by some wrongful birth claimants in other
jurisdictions, such damage claims have met with only limited
acceptance.13
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of con-
tribution in a malpractice suit in which the plaintiff, an unwed
mother, sought damages against a clinic for a failed abortion. 14
Plaintiff had sought damages for medical costs of the birth and
care of the minor child, and support for the child until age of ma-
jority. Additionally, plaintiff sought recovery for her impaired
earning capacity during the child's minority and mental and physi-
cal pain suffered by her because of apprehension that the fetus had
been damaged by the failed abortion and medicine administered
by the defendant. The clinic filed a third-party complaint against
the biological father, alleging his negligent failure to employ a con-
traceptive. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
third-party defendant, and the second district affirmed, holding
that the clinic could not demand contribution from the biological
father for damages awarded an unwed mother.16
Not until 1980 did another district court decide a wrongful birth
case. In Public Health Trust v. Brown, the Third District Court of
Appeal denied recovery in a malpractice suit for a negligently per-
formed sterilization when the child was born with unimpaired
health.16
In the recent case of Moores v. Lucas,"7 the Fifth District Court
of Appeal wrestled with the historically troublesome dichotomy be-
tween wrongful birth and wrongful life claims. Although early deci-
sions struggled with the conceptual differences between wrongful
birth or wrongful conception actions and wrongful life actions,18 it
is now generally accepted and understood that wrongful birth ac-
tions are brought by parents of an unwanted and unexpected child
for the pecuniary and emotional damages incurred as a result of
13. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979) (Handler, J., concurring); Schroeder
v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 844 (N.J. 1981) (Handler, J., concurring). Cf., Custodio v. Bauer, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Cal. 1st Ct. App. 1967) (if diminished capacity can be measured eco-
nomically, it should be compensated). Contra, Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761-62
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
14. Ladies Center of Clearwater, Inc. v. Reno, 341 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
15. Id. n.1.
16. 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
17. 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
18. Note, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537, 537-38 (1978).
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the birth.19 Wrongful life actions are brought on behalf of the child
and seek compensation for being born with certain undesirable
physical, mental, or social characteristics.2" The Moores decision is
unique in Florida because it is the only case to decide not only a
wrongful birth action arising from negligent genetic counseling but
also the only claim in Florida for wrongful life resulting from phy-
sician negligence.2
In Moores, Daniel and Linda Moores filed suit against Linda's
physician for failure to advise her that Larsen's Syndrome,2 a dis-
ease from which Linda suffered since birth, was inheritable.22
Daniel and Linda wanted to have a child, but would have avoided
a pregnancy if they had been advised that Larsen's Syndrome was
inheritable.2 " Linda Moores gave birth to a son, Justin, who also
suffered from Larsen's Syndrome. However, the damages for which
the court would permit recovery by the parents were quite limited
in scope and Justin Moores' wrongful life claim was summarily re-
jected. The district court upheld the lower court's decision to
strike Linda's claim for physical and mental pain and suffering
arising from her pregnancy and delivery because she had in fact
wanted a child and Justin's delivery had been no more difficult or
painful than the delivery of a normal child.2 In addition, the
Moores' claim for past and future emotional pain and suffering be-
cause of Justin's being born with Larsen's Syndrome was disal-
lowed on the basis of Florida's "impact doctrine."'20 The Fifth Dis-
trict cited the 1974 Florida Supreme Court case, Gilliam v.
Stewart,27 which articulated the accepted application of the doc-
trine. In Gilliam, the court stated:
There may be circumstances under which one may recover for
emotional or mental injuries, as when there has been a physical
impact or when they are produced as a result of a deliberate and
calculated act performed with the intention of producing such an
injury by one knowing that such act would probably-and most
19. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 409 (N.Y. 1978).
20. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
21. 405 So. 2d at 1026.
22. L-sen's Syndrome (also known as Larsen-Johanson Syndrome) is a deformity of the
patella, a triangular shaped bone located below the kneecap.
23. 405 So. 2d at 1024.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1026.
26. Id.
27. 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
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likely-produce such an injury, but those are not the facts in this
case.28
The impact requirement was invoked in Pazo v. Upjohn Co.,2 9 to
deny recovery to parents in a suit against a pharmaceuticals com-
pany for tleir mental pain and suffering related to their child's
physical deformities which were caused by a drug manufactured by
defendant and prescribed for plaintiff during pregnancy. The court
reasoned that the drug only caused physical anomalies to the child
and did not "impact" on the parents. Yet it might be argued that
the situations in Moores and Pazo are not the typical causes of
action from which the impact doctrine developed and that the pol-
icy reasons behind the doctrine are not present in these cases.3
There would likely never be any "impact" nor any intentional act
on the part of physicians, yet the anguish suffered by parents of a
physically or mentally handicapped child would likely not be tem-
porary or trivial and the risk of fraud would be non-existent.
Oddly enough, the court in Ramey specifically acknowledged the
emotional drain associated with raising a deformed child when jus-
tifying its exception to the bar against rearing expense damages.
This concern is puzzling since the Ramey opinion ignored the
Moores court's rejection of a cause of action for mental anguish.3
Over the last two decades, a number of other jurisdictions have
similarly wrestled with the moral questions and policy considera-
tions attendant upon the emerging recognition of wrongful birth
and wrongful life actions. A variety of answers have been produced
in response to whether "to be or not to be" is indeed a justiciable
issue.
III. THE WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTION
A. Development of the Cause of Action
The majority of wrongful birth actions involve the failure of a
sterilization procedure on one parent followed by the birth of an
28. Id. at 595.
29. 310 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
30. See, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971):
The temporary emotion of fright, so far from serious that it does no physical
harm, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial, that
the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere negli-
gence, where the elements of extreme outrage and moral blame which have had
such weight in the case of the intentional tort are lacking.
31. 414 So. 2d at 201.
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unwanted child.2 The typical situation involves the delivery of a
healthy, normal baby, which few courts will recognize as a tortious
event.33 The generally accepted public policy as expressed through
judicial sentiment is that the worth of a child always outweighs
any economic loss the parents might suffer.3 4 As medical science
progressed, and methods of identifying parents likely to produce
physically or mentally deformed offspring and techniques for de-
tecting fetal abnormalities in ventre sa mere were perfected, a
number of moral, ethical and legal questions were raised.35
In some malpractice cases, the existence of a cause of action
turned largely on the ultimate outcome, rather than focusing on
the negligent conduct itself." Although this distinction was sum-
marily rejected by the Second District Court of Appeal in Jackson
v. Anderson,.7 the position of the Third District Court of Appeal in
Public Health Trust v. Brown that no damages may be awarded
for the birth of a healthy child has become the more widely ac-
cepted rule. The weight of opinion against recovery for costs of
raising a healthy child was probably best expressed by a Pennsyl-
vania court in 1956: "We are of the opinion that to allow damages
for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal
public sentiment of the people . . . He wants to have the child
and wants the doctor to support it." 8
32. E.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967), Public Health Trust v.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109
(N.Y. 1977), Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964), Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219
N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974).
33. "Who can place a price tag on a child's smile . .. ?" Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d
124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
34. Id.
35. See generally, Milunsky, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and the Law, in GENETICS AND
THE LAW II 61 (1980); Note, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis: Parents' Right to a
"Perfect" Child?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 551 (1981).
36. LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (no cause of action for a
healthy birth; umbilical hernia not proximately caused by negligent sterilization).
37. 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970):
The physician whose breach and negligence are charged contends that a normal
birth of a healthy child precludes recovery, on grounds of public policy. We
disagree.
If the appellee's contention is correct it results in an anomalous situation. It is
uncontroverted that prior to the normal delivery of the child an action would lie.
A contract to perform an operation sterilizing the patient is not contrary to public
policy. Should plaintiffs in this situation file immediately and push for final hear-
ing before delivery? Could a dilatory defendant defeat recovery? Should we recog-
nize a cause of action defeasible upon the happening of a condition subsequent?
Id. (Citations omitted).
38. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (Lycoming County 1957).
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Recognition by the United States Supreme Court " of a woman's
right to an abortion within the first trimester of pregnancy has ex-
panded recognition of actions for wrongful birth. In determining
damages, however, considerations other than those of a constitu-
tional nature are paramount. Of major concern is the basic premise
of tort law that every wrong deserves a remedy. Society does in-
deed have a, compelling interest in ensuring that genetic testing
and evaluation be performed according to the same standards as
any other medical procedure.40
The standards of care to which a physician should be held were
examined in a recent commentary.4 The author puts forth the pre-
mise that in matters of medical malpractice, most particularly
those involving genetic and reproductive counseling, the standard
of informed consent should be adopted as the measure of the phy-
sician's duty.42 By focusing on the patient in terms familiar to lay
persons, this standard was thought to better gauge liability than
the more often used standard of accepted practice among physi-
cians of like specialty in the community. The informed consent
standard was used to find liability in Sard v. Hardy,'3 where a
signed hospital consent form was obtained but the physician failed
to advise a functionally illiterate patient that a sterilization opera-
tion might not succeed. As the Sard case demonstrated, the ade-
quacy of informed consent may not turn solely on whether the pa-
tient is informed, but rather on the extent and manner of
information provided.44
B. Damages in Wrongful Birth Actions
One state which has wrestled extensively with the damages issue
in wrongful birth cases is New Jersey. An early New Jersey case
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978):
Society has an interest in insuring that genetic testing is properly performed
and interpreted. The failure to properly perform or interpret an amniocentesis
could cause either the abortion of a healthy fetus, or the unwanted birth of a child
afflicted with Tay Sachs disease. Either of these occurrences is contrary to the
public policy of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 696. For a recent case discussing the issue, see Naccash v. Burger, 50 U.S.L.W. 2655
(Va. April 30, 1982). In Naccash, the Virginia Supreme Court allowed a wrongful birth claim
in circumstances similar to Gildiner.
41. Note, supra note 33.
42. Id. at 563-66.
43. 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977).
44. Note, supra note 35, at 563.
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dealing with a wrongful birth claim is Gleitman v. Cosgrove."
There the plaintiff asserted that the defendant doctor's negligent
failure to inform her of the risk of fetal birth defects resulting from
German measles contracted during the early stages of her preg-
nancy deprived her of the option to choose between continuing or
aborting the pregnancy. The Gleitmans claimed damages for the
cost of raising their child and for the emotional pain and suffering
caused them by the child's deformities.4" The New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for failure to state
a cause of action. The holding was supported on public policy
grounds as evidenced by the fact that, at the time, New Jersey law
did not provide for eugenic abortions.'7
A number of years later, after the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Roe v. Wade, a lower New Jersey court held that a
cause of action for wrongful birth did indeed exist. In a holding
quite similar to Jackson v. Anderson,48 the court ruled the trier of
fact should be permitted to evaluate plaintiff's damages.' 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not again rule on the issues
dealt with in Gleitman until the 1979 case of Berman v. Allan.50 In
Berman, the plaintiffs asserted a claim for wrongful birth of their
daughter, Sharon, flowing from the defendant's failure to inform
Mrs. Berman of the high risk of Down's Syndrome due to her
age.5" Defendant also failed to advise Mrs. Berman of the availabil-
ity of amniocentesis" to detect whether the fetus would indeed
45. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
46. The possible effects of rubella (German measels) on a fetus when the disease is con-
tracted by the mother during the early stages of pregnancy are cataracts, deafness, heart
disease, pneumonia, jaundice, and psycho-motor retardation. The fetus is at risk unless the
mother is definitely in the third trimester when the disease is contracted.
THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY, 1011 (13th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as MERCK].
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969) (repealed 1979).
48. See supra note 37.
49. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
50. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
51. Down's Syndrome is characterized by the presence of an extra chromosome and oc-
curs in approximately 1:700 live births. There is a marked increase (45:1,000) in the oc-
curence of this genetic disease in women over the age of 40 who give birth. Fifty per cent of
infants born with Down's Syndrome are born to mothers over the age of 35. Symptoms of
this genetic deficiency are placid personality (infants cry very little), slanted eyes (hence the
popular lay term mongolism), large protruding tongue and congenital heart disease. Life
expectancy is decreased by the susceptability to heart disease characterizing the affliction.
MERCK, supra note 46 at 1101-03.
52. Withdrawal of 10-20 ml of amniotic fluid during the 14th-16th week of gestation
which may be cultured for cytogenic and biochemical studies.
MERCK, supra note 46 at 1109.
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suffer from Down's Syndrome." The Berman court reversed
Gleitman on the issue of the existence of a cause of action for
wrongful birth. Citing Roe v. Wade as clearly establishing the right
of a woman to decide to abort her pregnancy during the first tri-
mester and criticizing the Gleitman majority's retreat on the dam-
ages issue, the Berman court concluded a cause of action did ex-
ist. 4 However, recovery was limited to plaintiffs' mental pain and
suffering. The court denied recovery for the cost of raising Sharon
Berman as both a windfall to the parents and an unreasonable
financial burden on the defendant physician.5"
In 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Schroeder v. Perkel"
permitted a damage claim for the extraordinary expenses attend-
ant the rearing of a child suffering from cystic fibrosis.'7 Defendant
physician incorrectly diagnosed the same illness in the Schroeders'
first child. The delayed proper diagnosis prevented the Schroeders
from making an informed choice whether to conceive a second
child who might be, and in fact was, born with genetically trans-
mitted cystic fibrosis.'8
Generally, those courts which have allowed recovery for mental
pain and suffering alleged by parents of a child "wrongfully con-
ceived" or "wrongfully born" have also allowed recovery for any
attendant medical costs.' 9 When the child was in some way handi-
capped, some courts have expressed an eagerness to ease the fam-
53. 404 A.2d at 10.
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 14.
56. 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
57. Cystic fibrosis is a common fatal genetic disease affecting Caucasians in the United
States at a rate of 1:1500. There is no certain method of detecting whether a potential par-
ent is a carrier of the recessive trait. Once the disorder is diagnosed in a child it is determi-
native that both parents are carriers. The probability that future children by the couple will
be carriers is 50% and the probability that their children will be afflicted with the disease is
25 %. The disorder commonly affects the digestive and respiratory systems of the body. Mu-
cous clogs the respiratory passages causing chronic pulmonary infection and emphysema.
The earlier the disease is diagnosed and proper treatment commenced, the better the prog-
nosis for a longer life expectancy. However, death generally occurs during the late teens.
MERCK, supra note 46 at 594-97.
58. 432 A.2d at 837. The record showed Mr. Schroeder was so concerned over the risk of
subsequent children being afflicted with cystic fibrosis that he underwent a vasectomy after
his first child's disease was correctly diagnosed and before the birth of their second child.
There is no in utero test which will show whether or not the fetus is afflicted with cystic
fibrosis. MERCK, supra note 46 at 594-97.
59. See e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), afl'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Troppi
v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.w.2d
169 (Minn. 1977). But see, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
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ily's financial burden through the award of damages designed to
compensate for the extraordinary expenses of raising such a child.
As the Texas Supreme Court noted, "The economic burden related
solely to the physical defects of the child is a different matter ...
These expenses lie within the methods of proof by which the
courts are accustomed to determine awards in personal injury
cases. No public policy obstacle should be interposed to that recov-
ery."60 Recovery for a variety of other types of tort damages has
been granted and denied in numerous jurisdictions. 1
In response to actions for damages, some traditional defenses to
tort claims have been asserted and discussed.2 One view is that
compensation for all reasonably foreseeable economic harm would
prevent wrongs from going unredressed 63 and thus would more
closely reflect traditional tort principles." The "special benefits
rule" has been applied," "[w]hen the defendant's tortious conduct
has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing
has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable." 6
A particularly persuasive argument to deny recovery for the ex-
pense of raising a child and to refrain from applying the special
benefits rule is found in Public Health Trust v. Brown:
We note that, under the contrary view, an unhandsome, colicky
or otherwise "undesirable" child would provide fewer offsetting
benefits, and would therefore presumably be worth more moneta-
60. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
61. Cf., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (other family members
could maintain an action for diminished parental capacity); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d
757 (Del. Super. 1974) (husband could sue for damages for loss of consortium); Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (mother could sue for pain and suffering
during pregnancy and delivery only; husband could also maintain an action for loss of con-
sortium). Contra, Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (no cause of
action for damages just to replenish family exchequer when healthy child is born).
62. See generally, Note, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CINN. L.
REV. 65 (1981).
63. Moore, Wrongful Birth-The Problem of Damage Computation, 48 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 1 (1979).
64. 55 WASH. L. REV. 701, 711 (1980).
65. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). But cf., Bushman v. Burns Clinical Medical Center, 268
N.W.2d 683 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (special benefits rule should not be applied to the gross
recovery amount; pain and suffering and medical expenses attendant to pregnancy and de-
livery should not be subject to mitigation).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
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rily in a "wrongful birth" case. The adoption of that rule would
thus engender the unseemly spectacle of parents disparaging the
"value" of their children .. .in open court. 7
The 'impact doctrine' in Florida would, as in Moores v. Lucas,
obviate the application of the special benefits rule by totally bar-
ring recovery for parents' mental pain and suffering.
Additionally, arguments for mitigation of damages have been
raised which alleged plaintiff's failure to abort an unwanted preg-
nancy or failure to place an unwanted child for adoption. Although
the right to an abortion is constitutionally protected, it need not
be exercised in order to mitigate damages. 9 Not only might adop-
tion not be in the best interest of a child, but "the parents' right to
keep their child should not be nullified by a physician's
negligence.170
IV. THE WRONGFUL LIFE ACTION
Nearly all claims for recovery under a wrongful life action theory
have been unsuccessful. New York briefly recognized this tort
claim in Park v. Chessin 1 and Becker v. Schwartz2 but these de-
cisions were modified to preclude recovery on that basis. The basic
difficulty is that the claimant asserts damage caused by existence
itself. The conceptual difficulties presented by an attempt to place
a pecuniary value on so enigmatic a quality as life itself make it
easy to envision a court's reluctance to address such a claim.
The Fifth District in Moores held that no cause of action was
cognizable at law for wrongful life and adopted the position of a
Pennsylvania court" that the value of life in an impaired state ver-
sus non-existence was a value judgment best left to philosophers
rather than to judges.7 ' In addition, the purpose of tort damages,
to put the plaintiff in the position he would have enjoyed absent
defendant's negligence, is at this stage of medical and scientific de-
67. 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 n.4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
68. See notes 26-28, supra, and accompanying text.
69. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
70. Note, supra note 62, at 75.
71. 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), modified, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976),
modified, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. 1978).
72. 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div.), modified, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. 1978).
73. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), modified, 439 A.2d 110
(Penn. 1981).
74. 405 So. 2d at 1025.
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velopment impossible relative to plaintiff's birth defect."
One of the more recent cases to struggle with the issue was
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories." The plaintiff's parents
submitted to tests conducted by the defendants for the purpose of
determining whether either were carriers of a recessive trait which
would result in the birth of a child with Tay-Sachs disease. 7 Be-
cause incorrect information was given to the parent plaintiffs by
the defendants, the infant plaintiff was born afflicted with Tay-
Sachs.7 8 The court concluded that infant plaintiff did state a cause
of action but construed the "wrongful .life" action as the right of
the child to recover "damages for the pain and suffering to be en-
dured during the limited life span available to such a child and any
special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition.''9
A few courts have touched on the possibility of an action by the
child to recover for the diminished capacity of the parents to ex-
press love and affection for the afflicted child. Although this ques-
tion was left unanswered in Curlender,80 Judge Handler's concur-
rences in Berman and Schroeder steadfastly maintain such
negligence is a tort upon the entire family.81 The decision in Aro-
noff v. Snider, holding that no cause of action exists merely to re-
plenish the family exchequer, would indicate that Florida law is
not in accord with Judge Handler's view.82
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida courts in Ramey and Moores have unequivocally ac-
knowledged a cause of action for wrongful birth of a deformed
child flowing from physician malpractice. However, the divergence
from earlier cases as to the types of damages recoverable works to
the disadvantage of the injured party.
By limiting the award of attendant costs of rearing the deformed
child to the time she reaches the age of majority, the Ramey court
75. 408 A.2d at 508.
76. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
77. An inherent recessive trait occurring at a rate of 1:30 in Ashkenazi (East European)
Jews. The disease is characterized by progressive retardation in development, paralysis and
blindness due to a deficiency in the enzyme hexosaminidase A. Prenatal and postnatal diag-
nosis are both quite reliable. Death usually occurs by age 3-4.
MERCK, supra note 46 at 1109, 1235.
78. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
79. Id. at 489.
80. Comment, 48 TENN. L. REV. 493, 512 (1981).
81. 432 A.2d at 843 (Handler, J., concurring).
82. 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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took an unrealistic and myopic approach to the problem of dam-
ages. As pointed out by Judge Hendry in his dissent, the child Ma-
ria will require special care and attention and support for her en-
tire life.8 3 Florida case law provides that support may be ordered
for a child past the age of majority when the child is, from physical
or mental deficiencies, unable to support himself. The parents'
duty to support the child continues as before. 4 Perhaps even more
significant is the fact that Florida Statutes expressly authorize
courts to require, in their discretion, support for a dependent per-
son over the age of eighteen.8 5 Until damage awards are permitted
to realistically reflect the emotional, physical, and financial injuries
caused by physicians' malpractice, wrongful birth actions will not
fully redress the wrongs committed by defendants.
Additionally, the impact doctrine should not be invoked in
wrongful birth actions. As the Florida Supreme Court pointed out
in Gilliam v. Stewart, the doctrine is not alterable exclusively by
the legislature. Rather, it is judge-made and may therefore be judi-
cially abolished or limited. 6
Wrongful life actions were earliest brought in relation to bas-
tardy cases where alleged damages were social stigma and impaired
property and inheritance rights. 7 When the court in Pinkney v.
Pinkney88 stated, "no one has an inalienable right to be born
under one set of circumstances rather than another,"8 9 the refer-
ence was doubtless to social circumstances. Today, courts are faced
with moral dilemmas concerning the quality and essence of life not
so much as a result of a raised consciousness but rather because of
man's greater technological ability to alter his existence for the
better, or for the worse.
It is, however, unlikely that a move toward recognition of a
wrongful life cause of action will occur in Florida. The weight of
opinion would suggest the position of the Fifth District Court of
Appeal in Moores will prevail. If the lead of the California courts
in Curlender were to become a trend, perhaps a more apt defini-
83. 414 So. 2d at 202 (Hendry, J., dissenting).
84. Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1952), Fincham v. Levin, 155 So. 2d 883, 884
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
85. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1981).
86. 291 So. 2d 593, 595.
87. See, Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
88. 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
89. Id. at 54.
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tion of the cause of action would be a life that is not wrong, just
not as it should be.90
PAMELA S. LESLIE
90. Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAui L. REv.
1409, 1432 (1977).
